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Abstract
This paper argues that the semantics of governance illustrates connections and provides a unifying
view from which to understand much better its natural branches: corporate, public and global
governance. In this regard, governance is presented from the point of view of a distinctive field of
learning and practice. Further, three levels of analysis are carried out to drive the subject home.
Firstly, it highlights the extent of corporate governance within an institutional framework, and also
gives heed to some performance measurement devices: the governance index, the comparative-
economics approach, and the governance slack model. Secondly, it frames the notion of public
governance while due regard is given to the World Bank’s methodology and the public governance
wave of reforms in the 80s and 90s. Afterwards, the development goes further to handle the
linkage among constituents, charters and representation, so as to later cope with the problems
raised by accountability and reputational intermediaries. Thirdly, it addresses the semantics of
global governance, country assessments and corporate governance in global settings.
JEL: G34, H11, F02
Key words: Corporate Governance, Public Governance, Global Governance
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INTRODUCTION
The sum and substance in corporate, public and global governance lies on what the primary term
“governance” amounts to. For the last thirty years, there has been a growing concern with the three
topical branches that stems from such primary term, but there has also been a marked neglect to
establish a clear semantic background for the whole subject. That such task might be worthwhile is
the main contention of this paper, whose development will run along five stages.
To begin with, focus will be given on what is meant by a field of learning and practice. After that,
the semantics of governance will be made explicit, coming straight to the point that although
governance can be regarded as a propitious field of learning and practice, it seems to be only a
discipline in the making.
In section 2, a functional definition of “corporate governance” will be set forth. Before doing that,
however, we are going to review some earlier workable definitions, all of them based on particular
issues, mainly linked to Corporate Finance and encompassing transaction costs, contracts and
property rights. Those remarkable achievements could not prevent practitioners and academics
from seeking negative and positive feedback in the realms of the Economic and Law approach,
Organization Theory, and even Political Science. Therefore, an embracing definition will be
attempted with three purposes in mind:
o firstly, to include under its scope not only corporations, but also any organization in the
private sector, even state-owned companies;
o secondly, to make explicit the main problems addressed by this growing field of learning
and practice;
o last of all, empirical attempts to measure governance will be fitted within the contextualized
semantics conveyed in the paper.
Next, section 3 will be devoted to public governance. There is an increasing awareness that
governing the public and the private sectors adds up to a relevant set of common ground problems
that can be handled likewise, notwithstanding the fact that sectorial differences are of the essence.
Besides, heed will be paid firstly to the World Bank’s approach to these issues and, secondly, to
the public governance reforms in the 80s and 90s.
Then, in section 4, we try to build up a bridge between corporate and public governance, by
accounting for the relationship of Charts, constituents, and representation. Finally, due regard will
be given to accountability and the role of reputational intermediaries.
Finally, global governance will be dealt with in section 5. In a world that becomes more and more
interlinked, the whole system has to work meaningfully. This is proving to be a hard task to
accomplish, because of national idiosyncrasies and conflicts of interest. The section also expands
on some empirical methods for addressing keynotes in global governance.Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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1. GOVERNANCE AS A FIELD OF LEARNING AND PRACTICE
Governance is a point in question to which many contributors in social sciences and practitioners
(including law-makers) have been giving their best effort and proficiency. However, it has still not
become a full-fledged discipline.
In the corporate realm, for instance, research dates back only to twenty years. On the other hand,
systematic study in global governance has evolved along an even shorter span of time. Whereas
governance has been topical for ages, its expansion in a sort of independent branch of knowledge
is not long past.
From a methodological viewpoint, therefore, mixed feelings arise when trying to set up a definition
of governance. Rather than looking for a discipline, perhaps a more cautious frame of mind seems
to regard the whole subject as an advancing field of learning and practice, a distinctive variety of
what amount to be the scientific style of enquiry and validation.
By a Field of Learning and Practice, it is understood a purposeful, enduring and rational
endeavor around a particular subject whose underlying tasks are
￿  to look for principles and goals attached to that subject;
￿  to provide an explicit semantics for the core of the subject;
￿  to draw basic and derived statements from a coherent logical system;
￿  to design reliable procedures to deal with focal problems in actual practice;
￿  to gather empirical evidence on which to ground their basic and derived statements.
Although we are going to stress how private, public and global governance become entangled in a
common-ground semantics, differences of overriding latitude arise among the three former
qualifications of governance, in spite of the nurturing similarities addressed all along this paper.
It goes without saying that a definition of governance ought to supply a framework as broad as to
give account of private organizations (either for-profit or non-for profit), state-owned firms,
governments (inclusive of all divisions, branches and agencies), international institutions [like the
United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for the
Economic Cooperation and Development], and multinational arrangements among several
countries (as in the case of EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR).
Therefore, the notion of governance calls for a streamlined definition to embody the expected
functions that intuition and scholarship attach to the tasks of governing organizations or systems.Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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By Governance we are to understand a field of learning and practice whose main tasks are
￿  the search of principles, rules and good practices that allow organizations to be efficiently
run within the current institutions, at a certain date;
￿  the design of mechanisms of representation, legitimate modes of wielding power,
enforcement of rules and procedures, accountability, control, incentives and standards of
performance to be applied to organizations;
￿  the efficacious pursuit of goals and missions that stem from the foundational charter and
statutes of the organization.
Against a more general background, beyond the one pertaining organizations, Governance may
be defined as the art and techniques to care for the way a system or situation works.
Remark
“Institutions” here convey the meaning attached to the term in Institutional Economics, as it will be seen in section 2.1.
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
For the last twenty years, Corporate Governance has become a topical subject matter. Although it
can claim that a good job has been done in understanding and shaping up some failures in
business organizations, there is still a long way to round up a discipline with particular features and
purposes. Not surprisingly, we hardly can get a definition of Corporate Governance that could be
met with strong consensus among scholars and practitioners. This unsettled question, far from
disturbing, signals a rewarding line of research. Hence, we are going to advance a functional
definition but, before doing that, it seems advisable to review earlier attempts to explain what
Corporate Governance should be about.
Williamson (1988, 1996) saw that corporate finance and governance are deeply engaged with each
other, because debt and equity can be regarded as alternative structures of governance, the
former leading to rule-based structures and the latter to discretionary ones. The study of
governance, in Williamson’s words, is concerned with “ the identification, explication, and mitigation
of all forms of contractual hazards”, while any single governance structure has to do with the
institutional framework in which the integrity of transactions is decided (in other words, how
transactions are negotiated and executed). From this viewpoint, grounded on the transaction-costs
theory of organizations, it follows that governance provides the means to attain well-ordered
organizations, whenever conflicts of interest threaten the accomplishment of mutual benefits.Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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In an inspired textbook, Monks and Minow (1995) contend that corporate governance actually
deals with “the relationship among various participants in determining the direction and
performance of corporations”. Regarding shareholders, managers and Board of Directors as main
actors, Monks and Minow carefully delved into the economic and law strands of the subject.
A mindset based on the agency theory of the firm is provided in Shleifer-Vishny (1997).  In the
authors’ opinion, the matter to be settled was about “the ways in which suppliers of finance to
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”. The mechanisms of
corporate governance consist of institutions (legal and economic) and they may be improved by
means of the political process.
Writing for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Zingales (1997) remarked that
corporate governance should be predicated on the exercise of authority, direction and control. And
defined a governance system as “the complex set of constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining
over the quasi-rents generated in the course of a relationship”. Thus, his approach hinges on the
incomplete contracts line of analysis. In particular, this author states that corporate governance
means that instead of bargaining over the quasi-rents generated in the course of a general
relationship, stress must be put on the “quasi-rents generated by a firm”. In other words, the core
issue is how rents are distributed in the firm.
In contrasting international experiences on how corporations actually care about their governance,
Demirag (1998) suggests that “corporate governance is here understood as the system by which
companies are controlled, directed and made accountable to shareholders and other stakeholders;
control is understood as including indirect influences of financial markets.”
In 1999, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) came up with a set
of Principles of Corporate Governance that intend to focus on the defining concerns of corporate
governance, basically on five topics: rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders,
role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and transparency, and responsibility of
the Board. The OECD sees as a common tenet in all governance systems “a high degree of priority
placed on the interests of shareholders, who place their trust in corporations to use their
investment funds wisely and effectively.” It goes without saying that, for the OECD’s suggestions to
be successfully enacted, fundamental reforms must be brought about in each member country and
all around the world [more background about this in OECD (1999) ].
Summing up: earlier attempts to get a handle on which meaning should be attached to corporate
governance are worthy of being noticed, but they stop short of depicting a workable semantics that
might profit not only from financial foundations, but also from broader views conveyed by
complementary disciplines in social sciences.
Trying to put the whole problem into some kind of perspective, the first thing to realize is that the
expression Corporate Governance amounts to an unfortunate misnomer. In fact, all organizations
in the private sector, by far, display a governance structure of one sort or another: sole ownerships,
limited or general partnerships, venture capital and private equity endeavors, small and medium
companies in general, limited liabilities companies and corporations, cooperatives, non-for-profit
firms [for instance, interest groups, foundations, universities], even state-owned firms.Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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Remark
Informative background on the governance of non-for-profit firms can be found in Glaeser (2002), while Berry (1989)
provides a comprehensive view on interest groups.
The second important point to keep in mind about a reliable definition of corporate governance, is
that we need to make clear what the words “stakeholder” and “gatekeeper” stand for.
Everybody that is able to hold a claim on any organization becomes its stakeholder: owners and
creditors (banks, investment funds, bondholders, institutional investors) and managers are the
main stakeholders, followed by employees (through unions and pensioners), government (by
means of taxes, regulations and complainants), suppliers (on bonding and trust concerns),
customers (on quality and conveniences), and communities (mainly on the grounds of
environmental damages or developmental issues). These qualifications have bearing upon for-
profit companies, state-owned ones (a national bank, for instance), non-for-profit firms.
On the other hand, gatekeepers (or reputational intermediaries) are those organizations that
should safeguard the interests and rights of different stakeholders: auditing and accountancy firms,
investment banks, law firms, market regulators, institutional investors, creditors’ trustees, NGOs
(non-government organizations acting as watchdogs of organizations, markets, and government
agencies). As global trends have been evolving steadfastly, rating agencies (for instance, Moody’s,
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch) and multinational arrangements (like NAFTA), are gaining a
stronger voice as global gatekeepers.
By Corporate Governance is meant the governance within corporations and nearly alike
organizations (including state-owned firms) that brings to focus the following subjects:
o Ownership structure
o Company’s founding Charter by-laws, statutes, and codes of good practice
o Board of Directors and Trustees; allocation of control decision rights
o Managers’ fiduciary duties towards owners and their management decision rights
o Investors’ property rights and protective covenants
o Conflicts of interest between managers, creditors, owners and other stakeholders
o Managers’ performance and incentives
o Rent-seeking and soft-budget constraints
o Production and disclosure of information to markets, regulators and stakeholders
o Accountability to regulators, stakeholders and investors
o Private, public and global gatekeepers (reputational intermediaries)
o National and international institutional constraints (the Judiciary, traditions, regulations,
and law enforcement)Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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For the purpose of this monograph, the definition above has some attributes that will also be
shared with the similar ones of public and global governance to be introduced later in sections 3
and 5, namely
o it is assumed that we are dealing with distinguishable tasks of governance;
o it includes the most frequent problems that, under the label of corporate governance, have
been the concern of most people engaged in the subject;
o it narrows down on the main goals corporate governance should address eventually;
o far from fixing a cut and dried meaning, it wants to provide useful guidelines instead.
2.1. INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
Organizations in general, and corporations in particular, cannot be isolated from their institutional
backgrounds. This linkage, suitably labeled “Institutional Approach” (or “institutional economics”
for some quarters), has widely been studied for the last thirty years. Being North (1990) a foremost
authoritative source, we are going to quote him so as to outline this distinctive point of view:
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised
constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human
exchange, whether political, social or economic. Institutional change shapes the way societies
evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change. [...]
[…] Organizations are created with purposive intent in consequence of the opportunity set resulting
from the existing set of constraints (institutional ones as well as the traditional ones of economic
theory) and in the course of attempts to accomplish their objectives are a major agent of
institutional change ”
When the study of corporate governance is framed within the institutional viewpoint, it can address
some core issues (as shown in Exhibit 1) to which alternative approaches have failed to explain.
The scope of the analysis allowed by the Institutional Economics’ point of view is broader enough
to deal with overlapping matters arising in public and global governance, as will be developed in
sections 3 and 5.
2.2. MEASURING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
For the last two decades, not only research and debate have been carried out, but also extensive
empirical efforts to track the record of companies in governance design and practices. In this
section, a brief outline will be given to three tools designed to measure attributes of corporate
governance: an econometric attempt of setting up a governance index, the approach of the
comparative-economics, and the governance slack model grounded on incremental cash flows.Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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a) The Corporate Governance Index
A promising attempt to give empirical weight to governance statements is the one carried out by
Gompers, Ishi and Metrick (2001), who brought forth a Governance Index that uses 24 different
governance provisions for about 1,500 firms per year, taking advantage of data collected by
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) since 1990. Exhibit 2 supplies more details on the
provisions that comprise the index.
For every firm they added 1 point for every provision that reduced shareholder rights. Firms in the
highest decile of the index are placed in the “management portfolio” and are referred to as having
EXHIBIT 1        
THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH CONTRIBUTION
TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS
a) What can be said about the ownership and control structure of any firm all around the world?  Is there a fiduciary
capitalism? [ This claim is well developed in Hawley and Williams,1997 ]. To what extent does the capital
structure of any corporation mirror the institutions of the country where the company runs its businesses?
b) Does the firm belong to the common law (anglo-saxon countries) or the civil law (continental European)
tradition? [ Background on this in La Porta et al,1999 ]. What about the regulations in capital markets on cash
flows moving around within and between national boundaries? Are there regulations on cross and circuluar
ownership?
c) How protected are the property rights of creditors and stockholders? How suitable is the law environment to
enforce contracts? To what extent a legal framework holding in a country can be regarded as a competitive
advantage for companies willing to invest in that country? How to factor transaction costs into a particular
governance structure? [ More on this in Demirag, 1998 ]
d) How transparent are accounting and reporting practices in each country? Is the information provided to owners
and third parties accurate and reliable? How to prevent companies and managers from creative accounting,
money laundering and self-dealing? Are there codes of best practice and to what extent they are complied with?
Do they enhance the companies’ value? Who are the reputational intermediaries and watchdogs? [ A handy
reference is Black, 2000 ]
e) To what extent managers are prevented from plundering owners or creditors? Do shareholders receive
dividends not based on profits but on the sale of corporate assets? How good are the covenants that the
company pledges on behalf of creditors, owners and other stakeholders? What are the incentives fostered by
formal and informal institutions so that companies become more efficient and reputable? [ Useful insights in
Coffee, 2001 ]
f) Which corporate governance procedures and practices should be enacted so as to avoid crony capitalist
countries, mafia-partnerships and terrorism linkages, from investing in corporations and banks through special
purpose vehicles like those depicted and widely used by Enron, and many investment funds, all over the world?
[ On the Enron’s disgraceful affair see Apreda, 2002 ]Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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the highest management power, whereas those in the lowest decile of the index are placed in the




Anti-Greenmail To prevent that a company could agree with a large shareholder to buy back his stock at a
high price for the shareholder’s promise not to seek control for a period of time.
Blank Check Preferred stock over which the Board determine voting, dividend, conversion and rights.
Business Combination Laws that impose a delay of certain transactions (asset sales, mergers).
Bylaws They are amendment limitations to change governing documents of the corporation.
Charter See “Bylaws”.
Classified Board The directors are placed into different classes and serve overlapping terms. It prevents an
outsider from gaining control of a board in a short-term horizon.
Compensation Plans Allowing participants to cash out options or accelerate the payout of bonuses should there
be a change in control
Contracts Indemnification contracts from legal expenses and lawsuits pertaining their conduct.
Control-Share Cash-Out Laws that enable shareholders to sell their stakes to a controlling shareholder at a fair
price.
Cumulative Voting A shareholder can allocate his total votes in any manner desired, to elect favored
directors.
Directors’ Duties They allow directors to consider constituencies other than shareholders when considering
a merger (employees, host communities, suppliers).
Fair Price These requirements limit the range of prices a bidder can pay in two-tier offers.
Golden Parachutes Severance agreements which provide cash and non-cash compensation to senior
executives upon a triggering event such as termination, demotion or resignation following
a change in control.
Director Indemnification To indemnify directors and executives from legal expenses and lawsuits pertaining their
conduct. This provision uses the bylaws and charter of the company.
Liability It limits the directors’ personal liability, mainly for breaches of the duties of care but not for
breaches of the duty of loyalty or for intentional misconduct.
Pension Parachutes Surplus funds are required to remain the property of the pension fund and this prevents an
acquirer from using these funds to finance an acquisition.
Poison Pills Securities that provide their holders with special rights in the case of a triggering event
such as a hostile takeover bid.
Secret Ballot Independent third party or employees sworn to secrecy are used to count proxy votes and
the management agrees not to look at individual proxy cards.
Executives Severance Agreements to assure executives of their positions or some compensation, but they are
not contingent upon a change in control.
Silver Parachutes Similar to golden parachutes but on behalf of employees.
Special Meeting They increase or decrease the level of shareholder support required to call a special
meeting.
Supermajority Charter provision for approval of mergers.
Unequal Voting They limit the voting rights of some shareholders and expand those of others.
Written Consent Limitations of action by written consent, for establishment of majority thresholders,
unanimous consent, elimination of the right to take action.
Source: Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001).Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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Their major findings can be listed this way:
o Firms with weaker shareholder rights earned lower returns, were valued lower, had poor
operating performance and engaged in greater capital expenditures and takeover activity.
o Corporate governance is strengthened by means of security regulation (at the federal
level), corporate law (at the state level, or the federal level otherwise), and corporate by-
laws, the Charter’s provisions (at the firm level).
o Agency problems can be mitigated by means of legal protection of minority investors, the
use of Boards as monitors of the senior management, also with an active market for
corporate control.
b) The comparative-economics approach
For the last two decades and in a series of well-known papers, a group of scholars have been
giving heed to institutional aspects of different governance regimes spread over the world, with the
purpose of finding plausible measures to account for topical problems arising in this field of
learning and practice. Among those contributions, we highlight below some relevant for the
contents of this paper.
o Large shareholders and corporate control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986): it was shown that
controlling shareholders face strong incentives to monitor managers and maximize profits
when they retain substantial cash flows rights in addition to control.
o Law and finance (La Porta et al. 1998): stressing the point that the development of
financial markets is hindered  whenever laws are unprotective of investors; five variables
were tested, namely the efficiency of the judicial system, the assessment of the law and
the order traditions, an index of government corruption, the risk of expropriation, and the
risk of contract repudiation.
o Corporate ownership around the world (La Porta et al, 1999): that showed that only in
economies with good shareholder protection there are firms widely held by many
shareholders; in most countries, instead, firms are typically controlled by families or by the
State.
o Investor protection and corporate valuation (La Porta et al, 1999): where evidence was
found that higher valuation is to be expected for those firms performing in countries with
better protection of minority shareholders.
o Comparative economics (Djankov et al, 2003): in which good economic institutions are
regarded as those that secure property rights, grant the people to keep the returns on their
investments, set up contracts and resolve disputes; the problem of disorder is suitable
addressed, expanding on ethnic violence, squatter takings, bribes, investor expropriation,
terrorism, public expropriation. Hence, the comparative economics deals with differences
in institutional settings bringing about consequences for economic performance.Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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c) The governance slack model
Another contribution to the task of measuring governance issues has been supplied by Apreda
(1999, 2002, 2003) who built up a model to cope with corporate governance problems based on
incremental cash flows, by introducing a “governance-slack” so as to track governance
malfeasances and enhance the managers’ accountability. The proposal can be made more specific
by noting three of its main components:
o The governance-slack is a complex of incremental cash flows where corporate rent-
seeking and managerial soft-budget constraint obtain eventually. Its structure, as depicted
in (1), can be regarded as a resources-provider if we shape it in residual form:
(1)
E[DCF t + 1 (governance-slack)]   =   E[DCF t + 1 (assets)]   +   E[new debt issues t + 1 ]   +
























































































































P DCF t + 1 (management pay package)]
Here lays the remaining value brought about by assets and securities issued by the company
eventually, after paying what the companies owes to bondholders and stockholders, namely
interest, principal or dividends. Going further, the “internal mutual fund” is the place where cash
assets (cash not required for operations, and short-term financial assets) and long-term financial
assets and provides with liquidity through the management of a portfolio of financial assets issued
by other companies or governments. Besides, the internal mutual fund allows for the financing of
“new growth opportunities”. Last of all, (1) gives heed to the incremental cash flows around the
“management pay package”, that not only include the fixed components of their compensations,
but also their performance bonus and contingent rewards (like stock options, phantom stock,
preferred convertible stock and the like).
o Simultaneously, a dual structure is ingrained in the governance slack whenever it plays as
a resources-allocator. Such structure follows from
(2)
E[DCF t + 1 (governance slack)]    =   E[DCF t + 1 (sinking funds)]   +
+   E[DCF t + 1 (growth opportunities)]   +  E[DCF t + 1 (asymmetric information and agency costs) ]  +
+   E[DCF t (risk management)]   +  E[DCF t + 1 (ownership and control)]
Incremental cash flows directed to “sinking funds” include fixed assets replacement, sunk costs,
bonds repayment, corporate venture capital, debt and stock repurchase provisions, internal
pension fund portfolio. On the other hand, “growth opportunities” refer to cash flows appropriated
for future capital asset investments, reorganization projects, mergers and acquisitions
contingencies. By “asymmetric information and agency costs” are meant those incremental cash
flows gathering around bond and stock covenants, agency contracts and incentives (most of the
items embracing the Board of Directors and the management pay package), agency problems andUniversidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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costs. Cash flows related to “risk management” encompass financial and credit risks mainly.
Finally, “ownership and control” refers to the decision-making of going public or private, the board
composition, allocation to gatekeepers expenses, and the issuance of convertible securities.
o Whereas on ex~ante basis, the Board can hold managers accountable for sensitive
incremental cash flows in (1) and (2) that could give room for earnings contrivances, it will
be on ex~post basis that managers can be held accountable for the performance of what
(1) and (2) convey in actual fact: a budget and a contingency plan to deal with corporate
governance problems.
Remarks
By earnings management is meant the procedures (anticipated incorme recognition, deferral of costs, depreciation and
reserves cooking, off-sheet charges and provisions, special-purpose vehicles) that enable corporate managers to
manipulate the firm’s earnings opportunistically and with guile.
The incremental cash flows are expected ones, assessed at the beginning of the period ( “ t “ ).
Background, details, and derivations of this model can be found in Apreda (2002, 2003).
3. PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
Governance in the public sector of any country points to the running of the State, taking into
account the mechanisms by which the government should work well.
As a matter of concern, Government has been a field of study and practice since human beings
built up structures and arrangements for living in society. But it was when civil and representative
governments sprung in the XVII century (being the Peace of Westfalia in 1648 a watershed) that
the subject matter reached the stage of a scholarly field of inquiry and practice, to be undertaken
independently from philosophical analysis.
On the other hand, the historical background of this development was provided by both the British
contractual tradition and the Enlightment which brought about, among other things, landmark
events or innovations like the Western Science, representative democracies, the Industrial
Revolution, the American Independence, the limited-liability company and the legal category of
corporation, the idea of countervailing powers, the claim of accountability of representatives, the
budget-control tradition, the spreading all over the world of both the property-rights tradition and the
political liberalism tenets.
Nevertheless, the interest in public governance goes further back only two or three decades.
However, it focuses neither in what the nature of government adds up to, nor to provide a theory of
how a government must be assessed, both topics in the realm of the Political Science. Instead,
public governance attempts to cope with a set of distinctive issues that overlap with Economics,
Political Science, International Relations and Law.
There has been a good deal of debate on Public Governance for the last twenty years, which was
included in the agenda of governments, lawmakers and international institutions. We want toUniversidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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highlight two practical achievements that sprang from multinational efforts: a benchmark for the
analysis of public governance, drawn up by the Institute for Governance at the World Bank, and the
widespread public governance reforms in the 80s and 90s. The former will be developed in section
3.1, whereas the latter in section 3.2.
After these prefatory remarks, we can set forth the semantics of Public Governance:
By Public Governance is meant the governance of organizations in representative democracies
with a distinctive focus on the following matters:
o The founding Charter and Bill of Rights
o The tradition and institutions by which the authority in a country is exercised
o Institutional design, division of powers, and bureaucracy to run the government
o The processes by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced
o Representation and accountability
o Protection of property rights
o Rent-seeking, Soft-Budget Constraint and corruption
o “State-Capture” by entrenched interests in the private sector
o Capacity to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and deliver public services
o Judiciary integrity and law enforcement.
o The role of gatekeepers (reputational intermediaries), groups of interest and the media
o Respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social
interaction among them.
Remark
By State-Capture is meant the efforts of firms to shape and influence the underlying rules of the game (i.e. legislation,
laws, rules, procedures, soft-budget constraints) through private payments to public officials. Corruption is usually
defined as the abuse of public officials for private gains. (Hellman et al. (2000) provides a good survey)
It is worthy of being remarked the efforts made by the United Nations in shaping a sound approach
to public governance.  In a contextualized definition, the UN states that
“Governance is the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a
nation’s affairs.” [Discussion Paper number 2, 1997]
Such a notion encompasses mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which
citizens and groups match their interests, exercise rights and obligations, and mediate differences.
For the global institution, the challenge facing all societies is to create a system of governance that
promotes, supports and sustains human development. Taking a further step, for the UN the main
characteristics of good governance are:
“Being participatory, sustainable, accountable, legitimate, acceptable to the people, tolerating, and
transparent. Promoting equity and equality, gender balance, able to develop the resources andUniversidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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methods of governance, to define and take ownership of national solutions, to deal with temporal
issues. Service-oriented, operating by the rule of law, efficient and effective in the use of
resources”. [same source as above]
3.1  THE WORLD BANK’S APPROACH TO PUBLIC GOVERNANCE ISSUES
This approach brings to light a sound methodological framework to deal with the manifold problems
underlying the governance of the public sector. Exhibit 3 intends to give a picture of such
benchmark.
Governance matters, as Kaufmann et al. (1999) have argued, because there is a distinctive causal
relationship between good governance on the one hand, national growth and development issues
on the other hand.
EXHIBIT 3
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
TO COPE WITH PUBLIC GOVERNANCE ISSUES
(The World Bank’s Approach)
o First dimension of analysis
The process of selecting, monitoring, and replacing governments.
Associated measurable concepts:
a) Voice and external accountability through citizens feedback, democratic institutions and a
competitive press.
b) Political stability and lack of violence, crime and terrorism.
o Second dimension of analysis
The capacity to formulate and implement sound policies, and deliver public services.
Associated measurable concepts:
a) Government effectiveness (including quality of policymaking, bureaucracy, and public service
delivery).
b) Lack of regulatory burden.
o Third dimension of analysis
The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions
among them.
Associated measurable concepts:
a) Rule of law (protection of property rights, judiciary independence).
b) Control of corruption.
Source: Fremond and Capaul (2002)Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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3.2  PUBLIC GOVERNANCE REFORM IN THE 80s AND 90s.
Global developments brought about a movement of reform in countries all over the world that can
be split down as belonging to two broad paradigms: the Westminster-Style Reforms and the
American-Style Reinvention.
EXHIBIT 4
REFORMS IN THE PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
a) Core characteristics
o Productivity: how can governments produce more services with less tax money?
o Marketization: how can governments use market-style incentives to root out the pathologies of
bureaucracies?
o Service orientation: how can governments better connect with citizens?
o Policy: how can government improve its capacities to devise and track policy?
o Accountability for results: how can governments improve their ability to deliver what they promise?
b) Westminster-style reforms
They were carried out firstly in New Zealand (as from 1978) and the United Kingdom (as from 1982,stressing the
idea of an accountable management through the Financial Management Initiative), spreading to Canada and
Australia afterwards. This movement focused in the following goals:
o new public management and shrinking of the government size
o market-style discipline in the government  and sweeping change in government functions
The Westminster-style strategy was grounded on a set of driving ideas:
o redefining what government ought to do privatization of those tasks that government should no longer do
o new budgeting and personnel policies; new contractual procedures
o changes and restructure from top to bottom; downsizing
c) American-style reinvention
This paradigm entered the stage of global reform later than the countries following the Westminster reforms
(actually as from 1992, under Bill Clinton’s government and his National Performance Review), but offered
impressive changes in the bureaucracy and administrative procedures (incremental reforms). Clinton charged his
Vice-president as the man to shape this reinvention of the government and Al Gore focused on goals that were
framed with catching expressions:
works better, costs less review everything you do
America@ItsBest safe and healthy America
The American-style strategy was fostered by the following driving ideas:
cheaper and effective government shrinking the scope of government activities
incorporate the best practices of business, from customer services to a focus on results
Source: Kettle (2000)Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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Remarks
Kettle’s monograph gives heed to sweeping and evolving reforms carried out by New Zealand, Australia, Canada,
Ireland, Greece, Netherlands, Iceland, Mexico, Italy, United States, Belgium, Norway, Spain, Denmark, United
Kingdom, Sweden, Austria, Germany, Finland, Turkey, Portugal, France, Switzerland, Japan and Korea. Background
on Argentina’s reform is given in Apreda (2001), Artana et al. (2001), and the Fiel Report on the Argentine Firms’
Productivity and Competitiveness (2002)
On deregulation and governance Kole and Lehn (1997) is helpful whereas Tornell (1999) gives a deep analysis of the
process of “privatizing the privatized companies” that faced the risk of replacing corrupt government bureaucrats with
private managerial mafias.
4. CONSTITUENTS, CHARTS AND REPRESENTATION
As governance deals with organizations and how they should be designed to fulfill their purposes
operationally, the metaphor of the contractual tradition may come in handy, not only to illustrate
connections, but also to provide a common ground for understanding much better the three
branches stemming from the notional trunk, that is to say, corporate, public and global governance.
In the beginning there is always a group of founders, the original constituency, who intend to set up
an organization, and they contract in to a sort of founding charter by which the basic rights and
duties of the constituents are laid down, as well as the declaration of purposes for the organization
that comes into existence.
For the new entity to be run following the chart not only efficaciously but efficiently, most of the time
the constituents elect representatives who must live up to founders’ expectations and act on behalf
of their interests, carrying out a fiduciary role on which the representative could be held
accountable at the end of the day.
As soon as the organization starts working, the original chart must be complemented by rules,
statutes, even laws. At this point, it becomes clear that the development and survival of any
organization is constrained or fostered within a complex environment of traditions and institutions.
Modern for-profit organizations are structured under the shape of corporations regardless of its
size, mainly because of the limited liability covenant. When the corporation reaches a threshold of
scope and scale, separation of ownership and control becomes a fact of life. The corporate
purporse is set out in the corporate Charter (or the Memorandum of Association, or any
comparable constitutional document). At this point, it is useful to bring back the constitutional
metaphor, viewing corporations as having enlarged constituencies and representatives with
competing, although not necessarily conflicting interests.
￿  Shareholders, who will appoint representatives so as to become involved with the day-to-
day running of the company, that is to say the managers. From a certain stage on, they will
also appoint representatives to mediate between them and the managers, that is to say the
Board of Directors.Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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￿  The Board of Directors has the manifold tasks of hiring, monitoring, rewarding and
punishing managers. Besides, they audit that the company is run so as to enhance its
value and increase the wealth of shareholders. Finally, they oversee the extent of the
company’s goals fulfillment.
￿  The managers are the doers in the company. Their role is fiduciary, in the sense that they
must advance the company on behalf of their shareholders, keeping in such task the same
prudence and diligence that they owe to their own businesses.
￿  The creditors, mainly represented through banks, institutional investors and bondholders.
Although creditors are the more influential outside stakeholder of any company, they are
not truly constituents of the private corporation because, in general, they had neither been
signatories of the founding Charter nor been appointed to the Board or as managers.
However, the more institutional investors or banks become involved with the financing of
the company, the more “voice” they acquire, to the extent of sitting their own
representatives in the Board and, in doing so, becoming part of the inside constituency
albeit being recruited from outside.
The founding by-laws of any company almost always prescribe a procedure whereby some body
representing the membership, for instance the Board of Directors or the Shareholders‘ Annual
Convention, has final authority over major decisions.
This arrangement of rights and duties call to mind a system of checks and balances, like the one
found in representative democracies by means of the so-called countervailing powers. The cast of
actors listed above plays this game of founding, voting, financing, running and overseeing the
government of the company.
Not to be surprised, this simile goes further and also becomes functional to a coherent analysis of
Public and the Global Governance. On this regard, La Porta et al (2003), examined two distinct
types of constitutional checks and balances on the power of parliament and the executive, provided
by the judiciary, namely the judicial independence and the constitutional review. They concluded,
after looking for data from 71 countries, that both judicial independence and constitutional review
are associated with greater freedom. Besides, judiciary independence matters most for economic
freedom, whereas constitutional review for political freedom.
Where does the corporate governance stem from in a market-oriented environment? From the
basic contract, and the statement of rights and duties every corporation had previously enacted
when they were born. That is to say, the Charter and the Articles of Incorporation, and also the
provisions contained in the by-laws. By the way, this also holds for non-for-profit organizations and
state-owned companies as far as their original constitution, statutes and self-regulations supply
with meaningful background.
By the same token, where does the public governance stem from in a representative democracy?
From the basic contract, and the statement of rights and duties every representative democracy
had enacted when they were born (and occasionally amended thereafter). That is to say, the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights provided with the primary source of governance, whereas
legislative rules and other shared norms or regulations perform as second tier of governance.Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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Finally, where does global governance stem from in the sweeping globalization process led by
representative democracies and multinational corporations? At the current stage, from the basic
contract, the statement of rights and duties, and the statutes every global organization had enacted
when they were born. A distinctive feature of global governance consists of different nations joining
together and appointing representatives to run supra-state organizations. There is no conclusive
evidence up to date that a second stage will show a supra-government to run all nations over the
world, but the European experience could be a blueprint for the time ahead.
4.1. ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPUTATIONAL INTERMEDIARIES
Either in the private, the public or global environments, a core issue to grant sustainable
governance seems to be accountability. It comes to be defined by the Black’s Law Dictionary as
the state of being responsible or answerable. Much more suitable to this paper’s purposes, and
according to Licht (2002), accountability should be regarded as a social norm of governance,
because prescribes legitimate modes of exerting and responding to power, dealing with the use or
abuse of power. On the other hand, Licht gives heed to four broad types of accountability systems
and links each of them with an institution that “plays a role as both a moral pull and a moral push”:
o Legal ( liability )
o Professional ( responsibility )
o Organizational ( answerability )
o Political ( responsiveness )
Accountability practices set forth social order and good standards in organizations, providing for
law and statutes enforcement.
When citizens in a country and shareholders in a company vote, they share the exercise of a
fundamental power: to set the tasks, appoint, renew, or fire their representatives. They also share
the power to choose a blueprint for governance for a definite span of time. But constituencies must
face four problems at the core of governance: asymmetric information, transaction costs,
opportunistic behavior, and the free-rider problem.
Asymmetric information refers to the advantage one party can enjoy by having different
information than his counterpart, so as to improve either the trade or the relationship for his own
benefit. When the economic or political agent realizes that he could get more from a trade or
relationship by not fulfilling his commitments, by means of calculated effort to mislead, shirk, hide,
deceive, misrepresent, confuse, we say that he follows an opportunistic behavior (Williamson,
1996). By the free-rider problem is understood a pattern of conduct that arises whenever some
people do not spend resources on collecting information but can take advantage of others agents
who had invested in such information, that is to say, they get a free-ride on somebody else’s effort.
Finally, transaction costs are, following Williamson (1996) “the ex~ante costs of drafting,
negotiating and safeguarding an agreement and, more especially, the ex~post cost of
maladaptation and adjustment that arise when contract is misaligned as a result of gaps, errors,
omission, and unanticipated disturbances. Also it refers to the costs of running the economic
system.” (An extension of the transaction cost approach to the political analysis, is given by Dixit,
1996).Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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Voting by citizens and corporate shareowners convey similarities and differences alike:
o decision-making is delegated to elected representatives;
o opportunistic behavior, bounded rationality, transaction costs and the free-rider problem
hamper selection and monitoring of representatives;
o shareowners usually agree on primary goals (unless a power struggle breaks out) but
citizens and political parties may contest both goals and means.
Whereas the shareholders do not dissent from the basic goal of any company, citizens in
democratic regimes usually dissent from the basic goals, the means and the ends of the political
endeavor. The more liberal the system, the deeper the overlapping consensus that allows them to
build up political stability in spite of disagreement and opposition stemming out of particular
standpoints in politics, morals, philosophy or religion [ the idea of overlapping consensues is
carefully developed by John Rawls(1996) in his landmark book Political Liberalism ]. While seldom
do the shareholders contest the corporate issues at stake (and that would unleash a power
struggle eventually), almost ever the voters contest adversarial political standpoints. As Przeworski
et al (1999) put it: “elections are a contingent renewal accountability mechanism, where the
sanctions are to extend or not the government’s tenure”.
Dealing with this subject, Latham (2003, 1999) argues that
“thus our greatest power structure – governments and corporations – are built on the shaky
foundations of voting, with its free-rider weakness”.
To cope with both of them, he suggests enhancing the role of the intermediaries in information
(infomediaries). As regards corporations, a suitable vehicle would be the Proxy Advisory Firm
(PAF) which can help shareholders to vote on the grounds of more information. Starting with
helpful advice on how to vote, infomediaries could expand their line of business and also provide
information to nominate directors, choose the auditor, or engineering compensation plans for high
executives. At this stage, the infomediaries become corporate monitoring firms (CMFs). Designing
a countervailing institution mirrors the political tradition of checks and balances.
At present, in handling these governance issues companies resort to the Board of Directors and
internal auditing mechanisms to prevent management and staff from breaking their fiduciary and
contractual duties. But accountability becomes reliable only when gatekeepers come from outside
the company. They are usually referred to as the reputational intermediaries (Coffee, 2001) and it





o Corporate Monitoring Firms (CMFs)
o Rating agencies
o Public regulators
o Self-regulatory organizations (SROs)
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EXHIBIT 5
REPUTATIONAL INTERMEDIARIES FOR A SOUND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Securities laws on full disclosure of financial results and self-dealing
transactions.
Ownership disclosure rules.
One-share, one-vote rule. In general, rules to prevent or restrict pyramid
ownership structures.
Strong, publicly enforced civil and criminal sanctions against insiders for
violating the disclosure and self-dealing rules.
Civil liability risk for insiders.
Honest, sophisticated and well-functioning courts.
Disclosure
Honest, sophisticated securities agency and prosecutors for criminal cases both
furnished with staff, skills and budget to accomplish tneir tasks efficiently.
Independent directors who can control self-dealing transactions.
Procedural controls on self-dealing transactions with review by independent
directors, noninterested shareholders, or both.
Civil liability risk for independent directors who approve gross self-dealing
transactions.
Board of Directors
Independent directors on auditing and compensations committees.
Market transparency rules (time, quantity and price of trades promptly disclosed
to investors).
Investor property rights protection.
Stock Exchange with reliable listing standards and active surveillance of insider
trading to fine or delist trespassers.
Enforced ban on market manipulation.
A culture of disclosure (“concealing bad news is a recipe for trouble”)
Active financial press and securities analysis profession.
Market Environment
Reliable judiciary system and widespread law enforcement.
Good accounting and auditing rules.
Accounting review of self-dealing transactions.
Civil liability risk for accountants.
An institution with competence and independence to write accounting rules. Accountants
Sophisticated accounting profession.
Securities lawyers to ensure issuers abide by the law and rules of disclosure.
Civil discovery rules and class action procedure to protect minority rights.
Liability risk Lawyers
Lawyers review of self-dealing transactions.
Sophisticated banking profession to investigate the issuers of securities. Investment






a) Rating agencies that furnish not only credit-risk ratings but also  country-risk
ratings worldwide.
b) Venture capital funds that allow new enterprises to be financed and
monitored, and also provide them with reputational capital.
c) Public regulators, like central banks and securities exchange commissions.
d) Self-regulatory organizations (SRO), either voluntary or mandatory, subject to
regulatory oversight.
d) Corporate Monitoring Firms (Latham, 1999)
Source: Black (2000).Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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With regard to public governance, the main reputational intermediaries are a fact of life in politics,
namely
o Political Parties





o Other non-for-profit organizations
o Journalists
The structure of Corporate Monitoring Firms suggested by Latham (1999) could easily be applied
to public governance, to the extent of monitoring the public functions of political infomediaries and
the rent-seeking behavior of government officials.
As Ortiz and Issacharoff (1999) highlighted
 “Although individuals cast the ultimate vote, other actors, like political parties, political action
committees, civic groups, corporations, unions, help choose the candidates the voters can pick,
promote those candidates, and fund their campaigns.“
Although liability, representation and reputation should hold gatekeepers and watchdogs within the
scope of their expected mission, recent events in the United States and some European countries
cast doubts on the extent to which deterrents could be successful. Some people argue [for
instance, Coffee (2001)] that unless the governance of gatekeepers might be improved, little hope
of real changes in corporate governance should be expected.
5. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
As from the 80s, globalization processes reached such scope and scale as former globalization
experiences never had. Not only were there technological innovations fostering a borderless world,
but changes in the way companies and governments broadened their purposes, and involved
themselves in worldly affairs. Demand and supply of goods and services became transnational
endeavors. And security concerns followed suit as well. Therefore, a complex network of new
relationships claimed for governance at a global extent.
Simultaneously, people witnessed the far-reaching growth of a global economy, whose main
features were, according to Gilpin (2000),
o open markets;
o unrestricted capital flows;
o pervasive activity and influence from multinational corporations.Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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It was an upside of this perspective to stress that multinational corporations carried out a decisive
bearing in single issues like trade levels and location of economic activities, issues that can easily
be embedded in the field of corporate governance.
A downside of this approach consisted of a constraining focus on economic matters, leaving aside
three distinctive trends that have been driving globalization ever since:
￿  the market-led globalization became intertwined with political nested
interests;
￿  the interstate system plus a composite made up of crony capitalism, mafia
partnerships and mega-terrorism has shaped a world-system that depends not
only on the capitalist world-economy but on its security-structure, as well;
￿  there has been a growing role of some institutions in pursuing a global reach
in world affairs.
By giving heed to such broadly based issues, some scholars and analysts turned out to a systemic
point of view of globalization as the best way to tracking down those developments. We are going
to point up three single attempts to cope, in turn, with these emergent processes all over the world.
a) The market-led globalization and the political interests, forcibly argued by Friedman (2000),
is grounded on three wellsprings of conflicting interests:
o The traditional balance between nation-states: at present, it encompasses the United
States on the one hand, and the remaining nations on the other.
o Nation-states and global markets: the latter are led by the Electronic Herd (millions of
investors and dealers wired by means of communication networks) that gathers in the
most important financial centers in the world, places that Friedman called “the
Supermarkets”.
o Individuals and nation-states: Some individuals can influence markets and nation-states in
more powerful ways than any time before, and that is why they are called “Super-
empowered individuals”.
Within this standpoint, some corporate governance issues expand outright, namely global
accountability, tight budget constraints for private and government debtors, investment grade
ratings, debt collateralization, global portfolio diversification. Bear in mind that whenever a
government issues a security to finance public investments, or refinance its fiscal gap, it mirrors
down what any corporation does when issuing its bonds or shares. This is particularly meaningful
as far as capital markets evolved towards a global environment.
b) Another encompassing approach has been introduced by Professor Escude (1999, 2002a,
2002b), who stresses the sum and substance of the “Postmodern World-System” as given by
o a capitalist world-economy;
o a fragmented security-structure with weapons of mass destruction.Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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Escude points out the structure of the international system as built up by:
o an interstate system that comprises those states that make the rules, those that takes
rules, and “rogue” states that albeit they are not able to spell out rules for themselves, they
are ready to reject those coming from the rule-makers;
o a dominant newcomer: the megaterrorism.
The advantages of this frame of reference to that field of learning and practice called governance
are manifold:
o The states which make the rules are also those that enjoy the best practices in governance
of private and public organizations, while states that take the rules exhibit a wide range of
achievers, either outstanding or substandard countries (as transitional and emergent
economies bear witness to the latter group).
o Rogue states gather as counterexamples of what might be understood by good practices
in corporate and public governance.
o Hidden economic activities, first and foremost money laundering, drug dealing, and
terrorism, find out their way through special purpose entities embedded in the governance
of global companies, while investing in offshore affiliates.
c) Lastly, an institutional global governance point of view undertaken by the United Nations,
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and some scholars [like Scholte (2000) and
Kettle (2000) ] raised the following matters of concern:
o Globalization conveys the emergence of a sort of post-sovereign governance, because
states cannot be sovereign in the traditional sense.
o The rise of supra-territoriality has promoted moves toward multi-layered governance,
where regulatory competences are widely dispersed across the layers of sub-state, state,
or supra-state arrangements and agencies.
It is worthy of being noticed how the Commission on Global Governance at the United Nations
defines Global Governance:
“the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common
affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may accommodate,
and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to
enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have
agreed to or perceive to be in their interest. […]
[…] At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships,
but it must now be understood as also involving non-governmental organizations, citizen’s
movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market. Interacting with these are
global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence.”
After corporate and public governance have being defined, we take the last step and address the
notion of global governance, following a similar pattern of contextualized semantics.Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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By Global Governance is meant the governance of supra-state organizations by means of a
twofold design of issues and problems:
a) those arising from the nature of each organization
o Founding Charter, statutes and by-laws
o Institutional architecture, division of powers and bureaucracies
o Representations and accountability
o Reputational intermediaries
o National and international institutional constraints
o Mechanisms for the resolution of conflict of interests
b) those arising from the interplay between companies and nations on a global perspective
o Corporate Governance
o Public Governance
o Statements of good practices and performance yardsticks to be followed either in the
private or in the public domains
Remarks
Among the most important global governance agencies in the world, we can point to the following: IDEA (The
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) that was created by 14 countries; ECOSOC (Economic
and Social Council, UN); IMF (International Monetary Fund); The World Bank; The World Trade Organization; The
Bank for International Settlements; OECD (representing industrial countries); UNESCO (United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization).
Although the role of overseers has a distinctive place in the design of either corporate or public governance,
globalization makes a claim for institutionalized watchdogs with the task auditing the quality of the representation, and
the accountability of agents on behalf of their principals.
5.1. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS AROUND THE WORLD
After reviewing different systems of corporate governance around the world, Prawse (1995)
concluded that
￿  Public authorities can choose the type of corporate control system they would like to see in
their country by their choice of the legal and regulatory framework they adopt eventually.
￿  Lack of information and human capital prevent good governance.
￿  Public authorities should realize that the legal and regulatory system underlying the
corporate control system may not be viable in the long-term, and they have to manage the
transition to a new legal and regulatory environment, as Japan is actually doing [an
interesting review on the Japanese reform is found in Ahmadjian (2000) ].Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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EXHIBIT 6
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS
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Exhibit 6 sorts out the main governance systems around the world, namely those following the
Anglo-Saxon, the Germanic, the Latin and the Japanese traditions. Bear in mind that almost two
third of the nations in the world lack reliable and updated governance systems or are in a transition
towards the attainment of good governance and practices, although for most of them the path
becomes shaky and still not fulfilling.
5.2. THE WORLD BANK’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS
This global approach (background and details downloadable from www.worldbank.org) consists of a
diagnostic instrument whose main features are:
o It can assess laws, rules, regulations and practices that govern the rights and obligations
of listed companies, intermediaries and investors in a given county.
o It also intends to become a communicating vehicle for policy-makers, domestic and
international investors to build up common ground and trust as required by healthy capital
markets.
o It is most relevant to middle income countries and transitional economies.
o None of the assessed countries meet the OECD’s Principles in all respects.
o A recent survey (Fremond and Capaul, 2002) showed that many counties were
undertaking to bring their Judiciary and Regulations in compliance with OECD’s Principles.
For instance, Brazil, Croatia, Egypt, Georgia, India, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia,
Philippines, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Turkey, Zimbabwe.
o According to the referred survey there is, in general, a distinctive gap between the letter of
the Law and actual practices.  There has been a widespread disregard for publicly
available information.
o Performance of the Judiciary and law enforcement stands out as the weakest points in
most of the countries.
o Stakeholders play an integral part in shaping the decisions of a company.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper intends to shape a conceptual tool that might enhance our understanding and our ability
to cope with the interlinked issues that arise from corporate, public and global governance.
In the first place, it contends that governance has semantic and methodological precedence over
its topical branches, clustering them into a field of learning and practice. In fact, it is the core
subject to deal with.
In the second place, public and global governance are distinctive realizations of the core notion,
but coalescing into a common ground perspective that allows the systematic study of each of them.
Last of all, the common thread that runs through corporate, public and global governance springs
from the basic features nurturing the core of governance:Universidad del Cema            The Semantics of Governance           Working Paper Series, number 245, September 2003           Rodolfo Apreda
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a) A founding charter shaped within an institutional environment
b) A system of rights and power, representation, management and fiduciary
roles
c) Accountability mechanisms
d) Monitoring and performance measures
e) Contesting rights and procedures for stakeholders
f) A responsive set of good governance practices
g) Production and delivery of information
h) Independent gatekeepers
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